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FACTORS INFLUENCING JUDGES IN INTERPRETING 
STATUTES 
ARTHUR W. PHELPS * 
There has been recent discussion 1 of abandoning the literal meaning 
rule and most of the other rules of statutory construction. A broader principle 
is favored which will allow the full play of the rational processes of the court. 
This view has great appeal, and, in terms of fr~eing judges who apply rules 
as rules without regard to their object, serves a need: But if it means a sudden 
release of the judiciary from always starting with a statute as it reads-as it 
is written-as it has meaning for most of us-it is a ham1ful suggestion. Law 
is something more than administration and the court must recognize that it 
cannot always reach the rational result for the particular case without sacri-
ficing systematic treatment for guesswork. There is a science of principles and 
rules which is basic to an orderly society. This paper will attempt, however, 
to appraise recent cases from the viewpoint of factors influencing judges in 
interpreting statutes rather than the more conventional one, for the purpose 
of finding any new or useful ideas that may be there. 
I. PHILOSOPHY OR PREDILECTIONS OF THE JUDGE 
A. Any Source of Intention 
Recently 2 the Postmaster General excluded certain books from the pref-
erential postage rate on the ground that they had blank pages. After Congress 
had amended the statute to provi.de that books with incidental blank spaces 
for student notations should be entitled to the preferential rate, the Post-
master again excluded some of the same books on the ground that they were 
not permanently bound and therefore not books within the meaning of the 
statute. 
Judge Groner found no clear indication of Congressional intention in 
the statute. In searching for a rational basis for decision he looked to an in-
dustry exhibit before the Congressional committee preparing the amendment 
to the statute. The exhibit contained some books which were not permanently 
bound. From this Judge Groner inferred that the committee and through it 
Congress must also have intended to include loose-leaf books when the statute 
was amended, although the only purpose of the amendment was to provide for 
books with incidental blank pages and not to define what was meant by the 
*Professor of Jurisprudence, College of William and Mary School of Jurisprudence. 
1. Horack, Tlze Disi11tegrati01~ of Stattttory Collslrllction, 24 IND. L.J. 335 (1949), 
2. McCormick-Mathers Pub. Co. v. Hannegan, 161 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1947). 
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1950] FACTORS INFLUENCING JUDGES 457 
word book. Because the committee had looked at an exhibit of books it was 
decided that Congress had intended to include all books in the exhibit which 
the industry was contending should have the preferential rate. 
It is difficult to see how an inference can be made from what industry 
wanted to what Congress intended to give it. The search of Judge Groner 
for other elements than the ones present on the face of the statute, and cus-
tomary rules of interpretation, did not succeed in adding anything. The search 
was not a necessary or a productive one. Obscuring his reasoning he says, 
"[I]t follows logically that textbooks of the make and quality of those of ap-
pellant were considered and purposely included by Congress in the list of pub-
lications entitled to the book rate." 3 
Judge Groner apparently did not like the fact that the Postmaster General 
should seek another basis in the statute for excluding part of the same geni!ral 
type of books after Congress had amended the statute. But in spite of the 
amendment there was an appropriate problem of interpretation for the Post-
master General as to whether the word book meant one permanently bound. 
This problem is not best answered by guessing at Congressional intent by 
reference to an industry exhibit intended to influence that intent, or at least 
that of the Committee. 
Adherence to old principles requiring a simple reading of the statute 
(which the court does, but shies away from) would seem an adequate basis 
for judicial treatment of this type of case, and one less likely to bring in ir-
rational elements which are not subject to satisfactory evaluation. The plain 
meaning rule thus used is not an inexorable or inflexible formulation to pre-
vent the use of common sense. It provides a restraint on arbitrary action-a 
starting point beyond which the judge need not move unless required to do so 
. by necessity. It establishes the norm for legislative interpretation. Departure 
therefrom should be justified by something more than that some basis for in-
teresting speculations as to Congressional intent can be found. 
A second ground which undoubtedly influenced Judge Groner might be 
called attitude or predisposition. It was exhibited by his statement that the 
administrative efforts to remove evils, "if evils they be," were not favored in 
this type of case where Congress had retained for itself the right to determine 
what should be carried as second class matter. But Congress had not seen fit to 
define "book" specifically. Any existing evils would be a good and traditional 
background for determining the meaning of Congress. It would ·certainly be 
difficult to justify an interpretation based upon the idea that Congress intended 
to foster the evils. At this point the onus must be placed on draftsmanship. If 
Congress has not made its position clear, evils necessarily are a proper· s<;mrce 
for the discovery of meaning. 
3. !d. at 875. 
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B. Consistency witlt Related Legal Principles 
In .1.Vforris v. McComb,4 the Supreme Court split five to four on the 
question df whether the maximum hours of service of drivers and mechanics 
(where only a small part of the business was interstate in character) fell un-
d.er the Motor Carrier Act, which is administered by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, or under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
The minority thought decisions on interstate commerce, with respect to 
the scope of federal power, did not establish a pattern or system of law which 
ought to influence the Court's judgment when Congress referred to interstate 
commerce in delineating the jurisdictional boundaries between two agencies. 
According to their view, the meaning of "interstate commerce" in the Consti-
tution in the context of the struggle for federal power was not the same thing 
as the meaning Congress might intend for the phrase "interstate commerce" 
when used in a statute devoid of constitutional questions relating to power of 
the Federal Government. 
To the majority of the Court, the factors of eliminating jurisdictional 
decisions and consistency of interpretation on what is interstate commerce 
were of major importance. Irrespective of the proportion of interstate com-
m~rce, they held that the Interstate Commerce Commission had jurisdiction. 
This split in opinion occurred in spite of the fact that the Court had al-
ready decided upon a policy of placing as many cases under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act as could be squeezed into it. 5 There is here a conflict between 
those who interpret chiefly upon the basis of some policy which has been de-
cided upon (or which is desired) and those who seek a reasonably systematic 
expression of law. To the minority of the court, the factors of systematic ex-
pression of law and the policy of elimination of jurisdictional cases should not 
override already settled policy which placed as many employees as possible 
under the more favorable Fair Labor Standards Act rather than under the 
more conservatively administered Motor Vehicle Act. 
Justice Murphy suggested the "rule" that exemptions from the operation 
of humanitarian legislation are to be narrowly construed : 
"Due respect for the legislative purpose militates against such a result. We arc dealing 
here with a statute that is dedicated to the proposition that laboring men arc to be treated 
as something more than chattels. And their rights arc not to be discarded bv adherence 
to formalistic dogmas of interpretation. Section 13 (b) (1) is not just an· C..""-'crcisc in 
grammar. It is part of the living fiber embodying the rights of those who labor for 
others." 0 
Distrust for the Interstate Commerce Commission and the desire to have 
4. 332 U.S. 422, 68 Sup. Ct. 131, 92 L. Ed. 44 (1947). 
5. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 60 Sup. Ct. 1059, 84 L. 
Ed. 1345 (1940). 
6. 332 U.S. at 439. 
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the widest possible scope to the Fair Labor Standards Act are the chief 
grounds upon which the dissent of Murphy rests. Under such a theory, all 
legislation should be interpreted to accomplish the desire br ·predilections of 
the particular judge who happens to be making the decision. Systematic, or even 
reasonably systematic, expression of law can never rest upon such a basis. 
If, of course, the Supreme Court as a body of intelligent men were to 
be committed the duty of formulating law as they thought it ought to be, 7 
and of correcting ·Congress where it may have legislated poorly, inadequately, 
or even in favor of special interests, then such reasoning would seem accep-
table. 
C. Attitude toward Administrative Decision 
A few years ago Judge Parker held that a letter of advice with regard to 
the administration of the Emergency Price Control Act for the guidance of 
price attorneys operating under the OP A was not entitled to the weight that 
courts accord to administrative interpretation evidenced by settled administra-
tive practice. The court through Judge Parker said : 
"And we do not think that the Administrator's case is helped by what is referred to as 
the 'Gottesman-Ailes Interpretation.' This interpretation does not, of course, like a regu-
lation, have the effect of law. Being merely a letter of advice with regard to the ad-
ministration of the act promulgated by assistant general counsel for the guidance of 
price attorneys operating under the office, it is not entitled to the weight that the courts 
accord to an administrative interpretation evidenced by settled administrative practice. 
... It would be absurd to hold that courts must subordinate their judgment as to the 
meaning of a statute or regulation to the mere unsupported opinion of associate 
counsel in an administrative department.'' 
Then the judge makes an amazing S\'l'itch to apply the general rule .. He con-
tinues: 
"Since, however, the interpretation in question received the sanction of the Administrator 
as an official interpretation, it is entitled to respectful cot1sideratio1t by us in interpreting 
the regulation ...• " 8 
The court here shows it is entirely out of step and patience with ad-
ministrative regulation but does not know what to do about it. The construc-
tive attitude would be to insure workable rules for the interrelationship of 
courts and administrative agencies, and to fire away on the political front at 
the substantive aspects of bureaucratic action. Idle and confusing, it is, to 
state, as this judge does, on the one hand that the interpretation was a mere 
letter of advice, then immediately to follow it \vith "since" it had received the 
7. A view already present in certain classes of cases, particularly those involving 
special interest legislation. See part III of this article. 
8. Southern Goods Corp. v. Bowles, 158 F.2d 587, 590 (4th Cir. 1946) (italics added). 
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sanction of the Administrator as an official interpretation, it was entitled to 
respectful consideratioh. The emphasis of the case is to encourage disregard 
by judicial tribunals of administrative interpretation. To do so promotes dis-
regard for law. The courts as the stabilizing institution of society should not 
lead in this direction. 
A better approach to such problems is found in a case before the federal 
district court, where Judge Murphy says of an interpretive bulletin of the 
Office of Housing Expediter : 
"The right of an administrative agency to issue interpretations of this character is 
already established. Such interpretations are entitled to great weight ••• and will be 
held controlling unless in manifest conflict with the statutory terms." 0 
The court then quotes the Supreme Court of the United States: 
"While the interpretative bulletins are not issued as regulations under statutory authority, 
they do carry persuasiveness as an expression of the view of those e.xperienced in the 
administration of the Act and acting with the advice of a staff specializing in its interpre-
tation and application." 10 
It is a brave lawyer who would hazard a general statement of the rule 
under the Administrative Procedure Act. Common sense tells us that the 
only possible rule is the one stated by the Supreme Court in the last quotation. 
A citizen is entitled to some protection with respect to his over-the-counter 
dealings with his government. At some point even easual information of gov-
ernment officials must be a part of the conte."<t in which law is administered, 
just as custom is frequently so ingrained in law (either through the jury 
system, or othenvise) as to be inseparable from it. To a lesser extent, per-
haps, the same must be true where the government is contending that the 
meaning~ of a regulation was clear in the public mind because of informal ef-
forts to make it clear. 
D. Premises Derived from Modem Science 
Modern scientific findings and attitudes are appearing in the opinions of 
several judges as dominant factors influencing their judgment in interpreting 
legislation, determining the common law and in settling constitutional issues. 
Such sources of law are regarded by them as furnishing for many cases a 
better premise than traditional rules of law. 
Where the judge is testing the old rule in the light of modern knowledge, 
an examination of these possible sources of law may be useful. In a recent 
case the court had to determine the constitutionality and appropriate interpre-
9. Woods v. Palumbo, 79 F. Supp. 998, 1001 (M.D. Pa. 1948). 
10. Id. at 1001 n. 3, quoting from Overnight Motor Transp. Co., Inc. v. Missel, 316 
U.S. 572, 581, 62 Sup. Ct. 1216, 86 L. Ed. 1682 (1942). 
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tation of a statute allowing the judge in passing sentence in a criminal case to 
consider "any information that will aid the court in determining the proper 
treatment of such defendant." The judge under this statute substituted the 
death penalty for a jury recommendation of life imprisonment after considera-
tion of information not admitted formally in court but obtained from the 
Probation Department and other sources. In upholding the right of the judge 
to do this the Supreme Court said : 
"Undoubtedly the New York statutes emphasize a prevalent modern philosophy of 
penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime. The be-
lief no longer prevails that every offense in like legal category calls for identical punish-
ment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender .... Retribution 
is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitatio.n 
of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence." n 
Thus we see that the modem court determines even such important 
guaranties as due process in the light of modern scientific findings and 
ideals as well as in the light of the results of an analysis of applicable princi-
ples of law. 
Murphy and Rutledge, though dissenting, have no quarrel with th!! use 
of modern science, but would decide the particular case, as a capital case, on 
their idea of the place of the jury system in American law.12 
Judge Jerome Frank is an advocate of finding the premises of modern 
law wherever modern knowledge can shed light. In Roth v. Goldnmn,13 he 
takes judicial notice of the report of the biologist Kinsey on sexual behavior 
and of books of psychiatrists and psychologists. These he uses in deciding 
whether Congress has constitutional power to authorize the Postmaster General 
to bar obscene books from the mails, and in making an interpretation of the 
law giving the Postmaster this duty. This excursion into scientific knowledge 
provides interesting reading, but no very intelligent application of the knowl-
edge appears in the case. If Judge Frank could prove by the best available 
knowledge that the widespread dissemination of lewd and lascivious matter has 
no general effect on.the moral tone of a people, he would have 'scored an im-
portant point. Instead, he talks of whether the average American opinion and 
that of the intelligentsia favor reading obscene matter and freedom of access 
to it on a commercialized basis. 
Propaganda has developed too far in its insidious and hypnotic effect to 
11. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 Sup. Ct. 1079, 93 L. Ed. 1005 (1949). 
12. " ..• the jury sits as the representative of the community; its voice is that of 
the society against which the crime was committed .... I agree with the Court as to the 
value and humaneness of liberal use of probation reports as developed by modern penolo-
gists, but, in a capital case, against the unanimous recommendation of a jury, where the 
report would concededly not have been admissible at the trial, and was not subject to 
examination by the defendant, I am forced to conclude that the high commands of due 
process were not obeyed." I d. at 253. 
13. 172 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 938 (1949). 
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say that the earnest and sincere efforts of the most intelligent must not provide 
broadly for the average American and his mental health. Society would never 
have progressed except for some compulsive rules founded in morality and 
having the sanction of law. Perhaps society cannot legislate morality; never-
theless society can see through government that the conditions are provided for 
its fruition and the conditions for the fruition of immorality are deterred. 
Restrictions on the dissemination of matter which is utterly incompatible with 
the decency and dignity of man is a fair, effective and democratic way of 
eliminating one of the conditions generally conceded to lead to immorality. 
While what is "utterly incompatible" may be a general principle, it is one 
which men of good will find can be applied more fairly with respect to matters 
of this kind than would be the case with more specific rules which Judge Frank 
seems to advocate if any restrictions are to be applied. Administrative matters 
of this kind must be left at the administrative level. Courts will never be able 
to articulate useful specific rules unless they are willing to bear a burden of 
cases which makes them supplant the agency delegated the duty of making the 
determination. 
In the broad area of human relations, the standards which have been 
generally applied have not tried to distinguish bad from good reading matter. 
That is left, as it should be in a free and democratic nation, to the individual. 
To do otherwise than deter that which is utterly incompatible with decency is 
to say that we should allow ourselves to be ruled by organized groups who 
will utilize all the knowledge of modern science to break down our will to seek 
the best society man can devise. The moral compulsions leading to the found-
ing of this nation are still with us and provide a sound framework for the 
development of a nation which can lead towards international as well as na-
tional morality. ·Can it be said that there will be no compulsive principles neces-
sary to bring about international morality? And these principles will have to 
be administered by men in the framework of their conceptions of morality 
tempered by law and science. 
II. PuBLIC ATTITUDE AT THE TnrE oF INTERPRETATION 
The effect of the re-employment provisions of the Selective Training and 
Service Act as it applies to the ordinary contract of the GreyhoJJnd System 
came up for consideration in King v. Satttlzwestem Greyhound Lines, bzc.l·t 
The contract attempts to create an independent contractor instead of an em-
ployer-employee relationship with the Greyhound Company in the maintenance 
of bus stations. The court held, in spite of the contract, that an e.'C-service 
man who had managed one of the bus stations before the war was to be con-
sidered an employee of the company entitled to the benefits of the Act. 
14. 169 F.2d 497 (lOth Cir. 1948). 
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The same factors which influenced the judges in deciding the Greyhound 
case appeared in the Brooks caseP There the Supreme Court of the United 
States decided that a soldier who was riding on leave in a private automobile 
could recover under the Tucker Act for injuries received from the negligent 
driving of a truck owned and operated by the United States although there 
were other benefits. to which he was entitled as a result of his status as a mem-
ber of the United States Armed Forces. 
In both cases the real question is how much a court will be influenced in 
interpreting a statute by its knowledge that the legislature and the people 
at the time the interpretation is made are very much interested to see that 
the veteran has no cause for compaint from treatment by his government. This, 
if we are realistic, is part of the context in which the statute must be inter-
preted. Othenvise an adverse decision will merely mean appeal to the legis-
lature and the whole problem becomes one of words, delay and confusion. If, 
of course, the strategy is one of avoiding the issue by delay, this interplay of 
court and legislature can produce the desired result. 
When the context was different-a period of national emergency during 
the last depression-when non-veterans were almost as prominently in the 
picture as veterans the court reached a different interpretation.16 It was 
then held that veterans' preferences did not exist with respect to certain 
ambiguous legislation. The interpretations in these last two ,cases both seem 
correct if we consider the difference in the public attitude at the time each was 
made. A court cannot close its eyes to realistic factors such as those exhibited 
in these cases if it is to function smoothly, efficiently, justly and even with ap-
propriate regard for systematic expression of law. 
III. FUNDA)JENTAL PUBLIC ATTITUDE 
Often when the phrase, "statutes in derogation of the common law are 
to be strictly construed," is used, the court is seeking a convenient way to 
make some policy of the common law which is reflected in basic notions of 
the people still operative in spite of some special interest legislation. This is 
the type of policy which would generally be reflected in the case if it were left 
to a jury.17 
In Shiffiette v. Lilly 18 the hotels had been able to secure legislation soften-
ing the strict rule of liability of innkeepers to their guests in respect to their 
persons and property. In spite of rather clear wording, the statute was inter-
preted as placing such a burden of proof of certain factors on the hotel keeper 
that almost all such cases would have to go to the jury where the result would 
15. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 69 Sup. Ct. 918, 93 L. Ed. 884 (1949). 
16. Gossnell v. Spang, 84 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1936). 
17. Phelps, What is a Questi01~ of Law? 18 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 259 (1949) • Phelps 
Appellate Court Articulation of General Standards of Cond11ct, 8 OHIO ST. L.J. 17S (1942): 
18. 43 S.E.2d 289 (W.Va. 1947). 
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usually reflect concern for the guest. Statutes covering this type of problem 
accomplish no major change in law unless they are implemented by reasonable 
appellate court rules supporting the hand of the trial courts in taking such 
cases from the jury. Where the statutes are redrafted to take care of the 
"needs" of special interest groups, the law in operation remains virtually the 
same unless the tri~l court takes a stronger position in applying the law to 
the facts than is customary.1o 
The courts are vetoing or permitting the veto of legislation considered and 
passed by the legislature when they adopt rules which permit a strong public 
sentiment to override such legislation. Yet the Anglo-American system of law 
has always provided this means for expression of democratic sentiment both 
in civil and criminal cases. In our present day society, however, where the in-
telligent interplay of strong group pressures calls for more intelligent treat-
ment of their problems, can a fairly won contest before the representatives of 
the people be allowed to be nullified at the whim of the people? The necessity 
for newer techniques for protection of all groups before the courts is one of 
the great challenges of our day. We passed from the day when brute force 
was an important element in trial by combat to the time when courts were es-
tablished to try cases. There brute intelligence-or the rough sense of justice of 
the common man-was substituted for brute force. Today, are we to find a sub-
stitute for this rough sense of justice in trained and properly selected judges 
in whom runs the common touch bolstered by the deep insights of the law? 
While some danger lies in this choice, it seems that the same protection against 
arbitrary action exists that protects a democratic society-liberal and free edu-
cation. Such legal education should not fail to provide better servants of so-
ciety than the average juror. This does not mean that the jury system should 
be discarded completely, but it does mean that the hand of the judge in the 
trial of cases should be strengthened. 
A strong argument can be made that the only appropriate protection for 
a fairly won legislative advantage which is also popular with the people is by 
the refusal of the courts to engraft any interpretations on the act. Regarding 
interpretations of the Federal Employers Liability Act Mr. Justice Douglas 
has said: 
"That purpose was not given a friendly reception in the courts. In the first place, a 
great maze of restrictive interpretations were engrafted on the Act, coustructions that 
deprived the beneficiaries of many of the intended benefits of the legislation, ••• In the 
second place, doubtful questions of fact were taken from the jury and resolved by the 
courts in favor of the employer. This Court led the way in overturning jury verdicts 
rendered for employees. . . . And so it was that a goodly portion of the relief which 
Congress had provided employees was withheld from them." •o 
19. See note 17 sttpra. 
20. Concurring opinion in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 69, 69 Sup. Ct. 413, 
421 (1949) (italics added). 
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With a keen insight into the problem, Mr. Justice Frankfurter asks the 
pertinent question for an appellate court whch is often lost sight of. He says: 
"Such power [to control the docket] carries with it the responsibility of granting review 
only in cases that demand adjudication on the basis of importance to the operation of 
our federal system; importance of the outcome merely to the parties is not enough." 21 
The cases of importance to the operation of the federal system will be 
those in which the court can enunciate an effective operative rule for the 
trial court or administrative agency. Occasionally the court will have to cor-
rect manifest injustice in spite of the fact that its opinion can be operative in 
the single case only. It must be admitted, too, that the cautionary effect of 
such a case may occasionally have definitive results in guiding trial courts 
to more just administration of law. 
Parenthetically, because the appellate courts have given little attention to 
how to enunciate effective operative rules for the problem of unlawful search-
es and seizures, it is ridiculous to pay much attention to Supreme Court opinions 
on this subject. No touch of guidance is provided and the law on this subject· 
is in a very unhealthy state. In such cases the general rule should be to uphold 
the trial court except where manifest injustice appears. The premise is too 
broad for articulation rulewise. Most trial judges understand the goal which is 
sought, a?d the application of the constitutional principle to the particular 
case, given a fair trial judge, will be just as sound as any arrived at- by an ap-
pellate court. 
IV. PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC 
It is difficult to determine today what principles the courts will follow in 
criminal cases where traditionally the rule of strict construction or the rule of 
ejusdem generis would have dominated the thinking of the court. More and 
more consideration is being given by courts to the type of crime involved and 
to the need for strengthening enforcement of the law relating to that crime. 
In Virginia a statute provided as an element of ~he crime of kidnapping 
that the act was "with intent to extort money, or pecuniary benefit." The 
court found that this element appeared where it was shown that a motorist had 
been forced at the point of a gun to start driving the defendant from Richmond 
to Washington.22 "Pecuniary benefits" was interpreted to cover free trans-
portation. While the crime was serious, it may be doubted if the statute was in-
tended to include it-at least under older applications of the rule of strict con-
struction. 
A similar approach has been applied recently by the Supreme Court of the 
Unite<l States in determining under an escape statute when the penalty for 
21. 336 U.S. at 66-67 (concurring opinion). 
22. Krummert v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 581, 43 S.E.2d 831 (1947). 
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escape began to run where a person had been serving several consecutive sen-
tences. The Court said: 
1 "We are mindful of the ma.-... im that penal statutes are to be strictly construed. And we 
would not hesitate, present any compelling reason, to apply it and accept the restricted 
interpretation. But no such reason is to be found here. The canon in favor of strict 
construction is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident 
statutory purpose. It does not require magnified emphasis upon a single ambiguous word 
in order to give it a meaning contradictory to the fair import of the whole remaining 
langnage." •• 
In another Virginia case 24 a broad construction of a statute was made 
so that the possession of a regular check-writing machine with intent to use 
it in forging checks was interpreted to be a criminal act within the meaning of 
a statute obviously intended to cover things "adapted" and "designed" for 
the forging and false making of any writing. 
Where the crime involved has been less serious the Virginia court has 
continued to apply the rule of strict construction. 20 An owner of a truck 
standing in front of an ABC store who was seen to place in it an illegal quan-
tity of liquor in small legal quantities was held not-to be engaged in the illegal 
transportation of liquor. This view was followed in spite of the general rule 
during the prohibition era that it was not necessary to show that a vehicle was 
in motion to show illegal transportation of liquor. The court said the prohi-
bition rule was based on a legislative directive that the Prohibition Act was to 
be construed liberally to effect its purpose. No such legislative directive ap-
peared in the ABC statute. 
The only difference between the kidnapping and forgery cases and the 
ABC violation lies in the nature of the crime. Unless this is an important fac-
tor, it is difficult to see why all such statutes should not be construed to accom-
plish their purposes as determined on a common sense basis. If anything, the 
seriousness of crime and its attendant punishment should make it more im-
portant to be sure the criminal understood the requirements of the law. 
But it is hard and probably ought to be hard to get the human or the legal 
mind to avoid a consideration of the nature of the offense and the measure of 
protection needed by society. The Supreme Court has said: "We resolve the 
doubts in favor of that construction because deportation is a drastic measure 
at times the equivalent of banishment or e..·dle." 26 
This problem will be a particularly thorny one in dealing with the en-
forcement of administrative regulations. Due to the mores of a free society, 
the crime of violating an administrative regulation ordinarily does not fall 
23. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25, 68 Sup. Ct. 376, 92 L. Ed. 442 (1948). 
24. Smith v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 10, 55 S.E.2d 427 (1949). 
25. Newman v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 803, 48 S.E.2d 355 (1948); see also Patterson 
v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 913, 48 S.E.2d 357 (1948). 
26. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10, 68 Sup. Ct. 374, 92 L. Ed. 433 (1948). 
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into the same category as kidnapping and forgery. The violation will also 
usually be by the noncriminal elements of society. Yet, frequently, the need 
will be extremely great for supporting the full scope of the regulation or law 
if the end or purpose sought by the legislature is to be accomplished. 
A good illustration is furnished by the recent case which held that a retail 
druggist who relabeled a medicine which he had purchased from a distributor 
residing in the same state had violated the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmeti~ 
Act. It may be doubted if under a rule of strict construction the retail drug-
gist fell under the requirements of the Act.27 Here the factor of seriousness of 
the offense from the standpoint of the public health is similar to the factor of 
seriousness of the crime discussed above and is bound to influence judgment 
of the court with respect to the interpretation of the law. 
V. OuTLINING APPROPRIATE SPHERES OF INFLUENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE 
PoLICY AND JUDICIAL PoLICY 
The case involving the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act outlined at the end 
of the last section is also an important decision to show the great weight 
which will be attached by many judges to the factor of administrative neces-
sity. Under this view, Congress wanted to give the act as extensive operation 
as the Supreme Court of the United States was willing to allow it under the 
Constitution. Readjustments of the act, if manifest unfairness to the retailer 
should occur, could be most expeditiously made by the administrative agency 
or by later Congressional amendment. The essential question in the mind of 
Congress was one of power. The administrative process could be seriously 
affected by a decision which skirted the question of power by creating a prob-
lem of statutory construction where none was intended to exist. 
The minority of the Court could not bring itself to give a liberal construc-
tion of the act to accomplish its purposes and would have, excluded the retailer 
in question from the requirements of the act. If this view had prevailed, it 
would have resulted in a number of court decisions drawing fine judicial dis-
tinctions, thereby weakening the act, and giving the draftsman of a new act 
insuperable difficulties. 
The puzzling aspect of this case is the position of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, admittedly one who has regard for the fullest employment of federal 
power to protect the public against evils arising from the present day national 
marketing of drugs. He was able to fall back upon the old analytical concep-
tion of statutory construction. He says : 
"The decisive question is whether taking a unit from a container and putting it in a 
bag, whether it be food, drug or cosmetic, is doing 'any other act' in the context in which 
that phrase is used in the setting of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. ... " •• 
27. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 68 Sup. Ct. 331, 92 L. Ed. 297 (1948). 
28. 332 U.S. at 706 (dissenting opinion). 
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It would not be of especial concern if this were the only instance, but it is 
a pattern of thinking which is to be found in his opinions in several important 
decisions of the Court. Perhaps Mr. Justice Frankfurter falls back on this be~ 
cause he had to judge under such tremendous pressures that he fled to the 
protection of the analytical concept of justice where the justifications for de~ 
cision can be easily demonstrated in the traditional way. The decision then 
comes from "the law" and the charge of personal ~dministration of law can 
be avoided. 
It is most unfortunate that Mr. Justice Frankfurter has been forced into 
this position. His talents for making the law fit the needs of the time are sorely 
needed-the fine touch of the intelligent mind dealing with all factors that 
make for intelligent decision. Neither Mr. Justice Cardozo nor Mr. Justice 
Brandeis had to face quite the obstacles of passion and prejudice which have 
fallen to the lot of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, which he has borne with dignity, 
reserve and courage. Justices Cardozo and Brandeis both had the urge for 
adherence to systematic expression of law and conformance to an absolute 
ideal of justice rationally determined. Yet they blended with those ideals a 
finer touch, which, in proper cases, allowed a discriminate and evaluative choice 
of other factors than systematic expression of law. Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
has not been able to do this in many cases. His opinions produce too much 
litigation, and this leads to just what he wants to prevent-uncertainty in law. 
There must be broad delineations of power by the highest court with adminis~ 
trative detail left where it belongs in the trial court and in the administrative 
agency. No appellate court can achieve administration of law; it can only guide. 
In the case of drugs it would seem that the factor of permitting a full and 
systematic administrative development was much more important than the 
question of whether a retailer might in the early stages of administration of the 
act not have known exactly how he was affected by the wording of the act. 
VI. STARE DEcisis AND LEGISLATIVE AcQUIESCENCE 
The Supreme Court of the ,United States has not settled on a consistent 
theory with respect to the place of the court in the process of changing its 
own interpretations of the law. It has at least modified its original position to 
state that the doctrine of legislative acquiescence in judicial construction of 
statutes is at best only an amciliary tool for use in interpreting ambiguous 
statutory provisions.29 Yet in a similar problem the court by a five-to-four 
decision reverts to the older theory in holding that the Supreme Court will 
not easily reverse itself on questions of statutory construction since Congress 
can rectify the error.30 The strong dissent puts its finger on the critical issue. 
29. Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 68 Sup. Ct. 229, 92 L. Ed. 142 (1947). 
30. United States v. South Buffalo Ry., 333 U.S. 771, 68 Sup. Ct. 878, 92 L. Ed. 1077 (1948). 
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This view does saddle Congress with the load of correcting the court's own 
emasculation of a statute. 
VII. CoNCLUSION 
A thoughtful consideration of the cases discussed in this paper must bring 
the conviction that whatever ought to be the case, legis\ation means at different 
times, different, often contradictory, things. Until each problem arises, a 
statute has no full meaning. An important part of the meaning of a statute 
must be derived from the facts and circumstances existing at the time the 
statute is interpreted. Two things bring this about : First, the judicial function 
is regarded today as administrative as well as interpretive. The court, particu-
larly the trial court, must ask itself not only what the legislation means ab-
stractly, or even on the basis of legislative history, but also what it ought to 
mean in terms of the needs and goals of our present day society. This approach 
is required by the insuperable difficulties of readjusting old legislation by the 
legislative process and by the fact that it is obviously impossible to secure an 
omniscient legislature. Second, if we are honest about it, the simplest legisla-
tion acquires its meat and bones and bite from administration-from the 
practical problems which must be passed upon and from the enforcement 
techniques which will be brought to its aid. 
The idea is prevalent that clear drafting of legislation will state the law 
for the subjects covered by the legislation. Law does have normative signifi-
eance and legislation properly and clearly drafted can accomplish its broad 
aims. But the important problems of legislation, particularly from the stand-
point of the lawyer, do not appear either preceding or during the drafting of 
legislation. They appear in the court or administrative agency when conflicting 
ideas with respect to the legislation have developed. The answers will rarely 
be found in the legislation itself. The traditional rules of interpretation will 
occasionally furnish the answers, but the modern court must give increasing 
attention to all of the factors which should influence judgment. 
